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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Phillip Andrew Turney appeals from the judgment and sentence entered
upon the jury's verdict finding him guilty of two counts of aggravated driving
under the influence and a persistent violator enhancement. Turney contends that
the district court twice placed him in jeopardy for the same crime when he was
charged with two separate counts of aggravated DUI, where there was only one
act of driving, and that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas
In 2004, Turney contracted as a cab driver with "U.S. Taxi" in Boise. (Trial
Tr., p.435, Ls.18-22; p.436, Ls.13-21.) On the evening of December 23, 2004,
Turney and Tom Sage ("Tom"), a driver for "Ace" cab company, decided to
"break off about 11:OO o'clock ... to go out to one of the bars." (Trial Tr., p.434,
Ls.8-10; p.437, Ls.14-21; p.439, Ls.3-13.) As planned, Turney picked up Tom
and drove them in his taxi to T h e Fireside" bar. (Trial Tr., p.439, L.17 - p.440,
L.9; p.754, L.15 - p.755, L.6.)

After they had "a couple of shots" at "The

Fireside" (Trial Tr., p.441, Ls.4-9), Tom drove Turney's taxi to another local bar "The Navajo [Room]"

-

where Tom and Turney continued drinking (Trial Tr.,

p.441, Ls.10-13; p.443, Ls.17-18; p.444, L.2 - p.445, L.l).

They left "The

' ~ Tom drove them to his
Navajo" around 1:30 a.m. on December ~ 4 and
apartment. (Trial Tr., p.445, Ls.13-17; p.446, Ls.4-16.) According to Tom, when
they arrived at his apartment about fifteen minutes later he got out (Trial Tr.,

p.447, Ls.11-22; p.448, Ls.8-12) and Turney "got in the driver's seat [of his
taxi]. . .insisted that he would be fine . . . and drove off' (Trial Tr., p.448, Ls.8-24).
Shortly after 3 a.m. that morning, 9-1-1 dispatch reported a "possible
intoxicated [female] driver ... in the area of Nez Perce and Vista at the Jackson
station ... in a blue Nissan Pathfinder, license plate 1A L6538." (Trial Tr., p.22,
Ls.3-15; p.39, Ls.15-17; p.42, Ls.17-19; p.59, Ls.13-19.)

Within minutes of

receiving this bulletin, Boise City Police Officer White stopped a blue Nissan
Pathfinder near the intersection of Vista and Palouse. (Trial Tr., p.59, L.22 p.60, L.16.)

Upon observing the driver of the Pathfinder, Travis Anderson,

Officer White suspected he was operating the vehicle under the influence of
alcohol. (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.22-25.) When Sergeant Hagler arrived to provide
back-up (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.10-16; p.62, Ls.1-3), Officer White conducted field
sobriety tests of Mr. Anderson and ultimately arrested him for DUI (Trial Tr., p.62,
Ls.3-22). After Mr. Anderson was handcuffed and seated in the back of Officer
White's patrol vehicle (Trial Tr., p.62, Ls.8-12), Sergeant Hagler moved the
Pathfinder off the street (Trial Tr., p.63, L.25

- p.64, L.2).

He then returned to his

patrol car parked directly behind Officer White's vehicle and waited for Officer
White to complete the investigation. (Trial Tr., p.64, L.25 - p.65, p.7.)
As Officer White started to enter the Pathfinder's license plate into the
mobile data terminal located in his patrol car, he heard a loud crash and went
"flying forward hitting ... [the] steering wheel." (Trial Tr., p.66, Ls.1-8; p.70, Ls.15; State's Exhibit IA.) Officer White immediately went to check on Sergeant
Hagler and observed that Sergeant Hagler's patrol car was "smashed ... and

extensively damaged" to the extent "the whole back end of his car was gone."
(Trial Tr., p.66, Ls.8-14; p.67, Ls.10-11; State's Exhibits 10-23.) Officer White
found Sergeant Hagler in the driver's seat leaning to the right with his mouth
open, his eyes rolled back, and completely disoriented; Sergeant Hagler could
talk but was not coherent. (Trial Tr., p.66, Ls.21-25; p.67, Ls.13-24; p.88, Ls.1724; State's Exhibit 17.) Officer White immediately called dispatch to report that
he and Sergeant Hagler had been involved in a crash. (Trial Tr., p.67, Ls.5-7;
p.75, Ls.8-25; p.331, Ls.1-3; State's Exhibit 1.) Concerned for Mr. Anderson,
Officer White pulled him from the back of his patrol car and sat him on the
ground. (Trial Tr., p.68, Ls.2-8.) In the course of stabilizing the scene (Trial Tr.,
p.68, Ls.18-19), Officer White saw Turney open up the driver's side door of the
taxicab that smashed into the parked patrol cars and roll out on the ground (Trial
Tr., p.66, Ls.15-20; p.85, L.4

- p.86,

L.1; p.86, L.21 - p.87, L.19). As other

officers arrived they took control over the accident investigation. (Trial Tr., p.68,
Ls.20-21.) Firemen at the scene extricated Sergeant Hagler from his patrol car.
(Trial Tr., p.80, Ls.7-24; State's Exhibits I 1 -12.)
Both Officer White and Sergeant Hagier sustained serious injuries and
were transported by ambulance to the hospital. (Trial Tr., p.94, L.lO; p.96, Ls.16.) Although Officer White was cleared to return to work three weeks later, he
continued to be treated for injuries to his back and neck. (Trial Tr., p.99, L.3 p.102, L.16.) At the time of trial, nearly fourteen months later, Officer White was
still undergoing treatment; he had received a "five percent impairment rating on
his neck and was scheduled to undergo extensive shoulder surgery. (Trial Tr.,

p.102, L.20 - p.103, L.7.) Sergeant Hagler sustained several injuries including a
brain injury, memory loss, a broken nose, numbness in his hands, a neck injury
and a low back injury causing him to struggle with decreased work performance.
(Trial Tr., p.695, L.19 - p.699, L.22.)
The state charged Turney with two counts of aggravated driving under the
influence, in violation of I.C.

9

18-8006, for the injuries inflicted on Boise City

Police Officers Hagler and White as a result of Turney's taxicab smashing into
their parked patrol cars. (R., pp.25-26; 101-02.) The state also charged Turney
with being a persistent violator. (R., pp. 36-38.) At trial, Turney admitted he blew
. I 6 shortly after the crash (Trial Tr., p.759, Ls.20-23; p.764, Ls.15-24; p.776,
Ls.11-13; p.797, Ls.8-13) but denied he was driving the taxi (Trial Tr., p.775,
Ls.17-18; p.776, Ls.10-14).

Turney contended he had fallen asleep in the

backseat and that Tom was actually driving the taxi at the time of the crash.
(Trial Tr., p.766, L.20 - p.768, L.2; p.769, Ls.2-4; p.774, Ls.5-9; Trial Tr., p.775,
Ls.17-18; p.803, Ls.23-24.) At trial Tom admitted to driving Turney's cab earlier
in the evening, but testified that he was not in the taxi or driving it at the time of
the accident. (Trial Tr., p.441, L.18

- p.444,

L.13; p.448, L.8 - p.449, L.13.)

After a five day trial, the jury found Turney guilty of both counts of aggravated
DUI and of being a persistent violator.

(R., pp.139-41.)

The district court

sentenced Turney to concurrent unified life sentences, with a minimum period of
confinement of fifteen years. (Sent. Tr., p.1050, L.2 - p.1051, L.4; R., pp.15860.) The district court denied Turney's Rule 35 Motion. (R., pp.187-90.) Turney
timely appealed. (R., pp.162-64; 192-95.)

ISSUES
Turney states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was Mr. Turney twice put in jeopardy for the same offense
when he was charged and convicted of two counts of
aggravated DUI when there was only one act of driving?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed
concurrent sentences of life, with fifteen years fixed?

(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Has Turney's failure to file a I.C.R. 12(b)(2) motion challenging the
information prior to trial preclude him from challenging the information now for the
first time on appeal?
If Turney's claim is reviewable, has Turney failed to establish that he
2.
was punished twice for the same offense?
Has Turney failed to carry his burden of establishing that the district
court abused its discretion when it imposed concurrent unified life sentences with
15 years fixed upon his conviction for two counts of aggravated DUI and being a
persistent violator?

3.

ARGUMENT

I.
Turnev's Failure To Challenge Defects In The lnformation Prior To Trial
Precludes Turnev From Raising This lssue For The First Time On Appeal
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Turney argues that his right to be free from

double jeopardy was violated because, he claims, "he was charged with two
separate counts of aggravated DUI ... [when] there was clearly only one act of
driving." (Appellant's brief, p.6 (emphasis added).) Turney's claim fails. An
objection or claim based upon defects in the information can be waived.
Because Turney failed to object to the charges in the information prior to trial, he
is barred from raising the issue on appeal. As such, Turney's claim was not
preserved for appeal and should be dismissed.
B.

Standard of Review
Interpretation of court rules is a question of law reviewed de novo.

State v. Moore, 131 ldaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998).
C.

Turnev's Double Jeopardy Claim Based Upon His Objection To The
lnformation is Barred Bv His Failure To Raise The lssue Prior To Trial As
Required By I.C.R. 12(b)(2)
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). This same
principle is embodied in I.C.R. 12, which reads, in relevant part:

(b) Pretrial motions. Any defense objection or request which is
capable of determination without trial of the general issue may be
raised before trial by motion. The following must be raised prior o
trial:

....
(2)
Defenses and objections based upon defects in the
complaint, indictment or information (other than it fails to show
jurisdiction of the court or to charge any offense which objection
shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the
proceedings);

....

(9 Effect of Failure to Raise Defenses or Objections. Failure by
the defendant to raise defenses or objections or to make requests
which must be made prior to trial...shall constitute waiver thereof,
but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.
I.C.R. 12 (emphasis in original).
The ldaho Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this rule:
The are a host of due process requirements that must be
met by a charging document, such as factual specificity adequate
to "enable a person of common understanding to know what is
intended" and to shield against double jeopardy. State v. Grady, 89
ldaho 204, 208-09, 404 P.2d 347, 349-50 (1965); see I.C. § 191418. Although such due process concerns may be valid, they are
waived unless raised before trial.
I.C.R. 12(b)(2); State v.
Halbesleben, 139 ldaho 165, 168, 75 P.3d 219, 222 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Robran, 119 ldaho at 287, 805 P.2d at 493.
State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 758, 101 P.3d 699, 702 (2004) (where the
defendant moved to dismiss the charges prior to trial alleging that the information
failed to allege sufficient facts to provide notice and protect against double
jeopardy).
Although Turney "acknowledges that no objection was made in the district
court to [the state] bringing two charges of aggravated DUI," a review of his claim
shows Turney is attempting to now belatedly raise a claim there are defects in
the information for the first time on appeal. Such challenges to the charging

document, however, must be made prior to trial. I.C.R. 12(b)(2).

Turney's

appellate claim that the state was precluded from charging two counts of
aggravated DUI is, therefore, not preserved and may not be considered for the
first time on appeal absent a showing of fundamental error.

See

State v.

Anderson, 144 ldaho 743,748, 170 P.3d 886,891 (2007).
"Before reaching the issue of whether fundamental error is reviewable, or
whether fundamental error occurred at all, it first must be determined whether the
district court even committed an error." Anderson, 144 ldaho at 748, 170 P.3d at
891.

In this case, Turney's mere implication of a double jeopardy claim based

upon the information charging two counts of aggravated DUI does not constitute
error, much less fundamental error. Under I.C.R. 12(b)(2), a motion to dismiss
based upon objections to the information which are not jurisdictional or based
upon a failure to charge must be raised prior to trial, and the failure to timely raise
such objections results in a waiver of that claim on appeal. I.C.R. 12(b)(2) and
I.C.R. IZ(f).

Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 758, 101 P.3d 699, 702. (citing State v. Luke,

134 ldaho 294, 300, 1 P.3d 795, 801 (2000));

see State v. Quintero, 141 ldaho

619, 115 P.3d 710 (2005) (holding that any due process challenges to the
information were waived because they were not raised before commencement of
trial, but Quintero could raise a jurisdictional challenge to information); State v.
Cahoon, 116 ldaho 399, 400, 775 P.2d 1241, 1242 (1989) (concluding that the
defendant could challenge the sufficiency of a citation, but that the citation
charged the offense for which the defendant was convicted). Turney's right to
challenge any defects in the information was waived when he failed to raise this

issue prior to trial. I.C.R. 12(b). As such, Turney has failed to show error, much
less fundamental error.
In addition. this Court should not be inclined to conclude an error is
fundamental in cases where the failure to challenge the information "may be
done for legitimate strategic or tactical purposes." Mintun v. State, 144 ldaho
656, 662, 168 P.3d 40, 46 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted) (noting that "a trial
attorney's failure to object to inadmissible evidence or other potential errors may
be done for legitimate strategic or tactical purposes.") It is quite possible in this
case that counsel for Turney did not object to the information charging him with
committing two counts of aggravated DUI because it would serve no purpose (as
discussed in more detail in Section 11, below) other than to highlight that two
Boise City police officers were seriously injured by Turney's drunk driving. The
victims in this case should not be subject to another trial because counsel failed
to object to the information and may have done so solely for tactical reasons
II.
Even If Turnev's Challeqe To The Complaint Was Not Waived, Turnev Has
Failed To Establish A Double Jeopardv Violation
A.

Introduction
Even if this Court determines Turney's claim challenging the information is

reviewable, his claim that the state violated his right to be free from double
jeopardy is not supported in law.

In arguing the state twice placed him in

jeopardy when he was convicted of two counts of aggravated DUI which arose
out of one act of driving (Appellant's brief, pp.7-12), Turney ignores contrary
ldaho Supreme Court case law which holds otherwise,

B.

Standard of Review
Whether a prosecution complies with the constitutional protection against

being placed twice in jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review.

State

v. Hussain, 143 ldaho 175, 176, 139 P.3d 777,778 (Ct. App. 2006).
C.

Turney Has Failed To Establish That The State Violated Turney's Double
Jeopardy Riqhts By Pursuing Two Counts Of Agqravated DUI
Turney has failed to establish that he was punished twice for the same

offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." This Clause affords a defendant three basic protections.

It protects

against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal
punishments for the same offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994);
State v. McKeeth, 136 ldaho 619, 622, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2001).
However, "offenses committed against multiple victims are not the same offense,
for double jeopardy purposes, even though they may arise from the same
criminal episode." State v. Alsanea, 138 ldaho 733, 744, 69 P.3d 153,164 (Ct.
App. 2003); see also State v. Maior, 111 ldaho 41 0, 415 n. I , 725 P.2d 115, 120
n.1 (1986)

(mWilkoff v. Superior Court, 696 P.2d 134, 138 (Cal. 1985)).

In this case, Turney was convicted of two counts of aggravated DUI, I.C. 3
18-8006, for causing debilitating injuries to two victims
Officer White

- when

- Sergeant Hagler and

he crashed his taxi while driving with a . I 6 blood alcohol

level. Although Turney's single act of driving while intoxicated injured multiple
victims for which he was subjected to multiple punishments, Turney nevertheless
attempts to raise a "double jeopardy" claim, relying specifically on the ldaho
Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Lowe, 120 ldaho 391, 816 P.2d 347 (1990).
Although no double jeopardy claim was raised in &,

Turney cites &

(hereinafter "Lowe I") for the proposition that multiple punishments are
permissible "when multiple injuries result from a single act of violence." Lowe I,
120 ldaho at 393, 816 P.2d at 349 (emphasis added). (Appellant's brief, pp.912.) He further relies on Judge Swanstrom's specially concurring opinion in
Lowe I, to suggest "a different rule should apply to crimes of aggravated DUf
under 5 18-8006."
Turney's reliance on Lowe I, however, is misplaced, especially given the
ldaho Supreme Court's subsequent review of that decision. In granting review of
Lowe I, the ldaho Supreme Court did not adopt such a rule.
-

State v. Lowe, 120

ldaho 252, 255, 815 P.2d 450, 453 (1991) (hereinafter "Lowe 11"). Rather, the
ldaho Supreme Court determined multiple punishments are permissible where a
defendant's single act of driving under the influence results in serious injuries to
more than one victim.

Id.

In adopting a "multiple victims" test, the ldaho

Supreme Court explained:
In this case, there were two victims. The fact that Lowe's vehicle
collided with the Smith vehicle only once, does not mean Lowe was
guilty of only one act or omission. Lowe's conduct constituted a
separate act or omission with regard to each victim.

....
In this case, the fact that the person who suffered great bodily harm
in the aggravated DUI (Blake) is different than the person who was

killed in the vehicular manslaughter (Mary) is significant. Lowe's
injury of Blake was one act or omission; Lowe's killing of Mary was
another act or omission. I.C. Ij 18-301 was not intended to prevent
multiple prosecutions or punishments in cases where more than
one victim is involved.

m,120 ldaho at 255, 815 P.2d at 453 (1991).

Directly contrary to Turney's

contention, the ldaho Supreme Court has determined, specifically relying upon its
analysis in Lowe II, that the state is authorized to prosecute and punish an
individual for multiple counts of aggravated DUI that arise from one incident.
State v. Garner, 121 ldaho 196, 824 P.2d 127 (1992) (affirming convictions and
sentences for three counts of aggravated DUI where three victims were injured in
a collision caused by the defendant's act of driving while intoxicated).
Although neither Lowe II or Garner involved claims of constitutional double
jeopardy, both cases involved claims brought under I.C. Ij 18-301 (repealed
1995) which provided a greater scope of protection than that found in the ldaho
and United States Constitutions.

See

State v. Seamons, 126 ldaho 809, 811,

892 P.2d 484, 486 (Ct. App. 1995) ("I.C. Ij 18-301 provides a greater scope of
protection than the constraints of double jeopardy found in the ldaho and United
States Constitutions"); State v. Horn, 101 ldaho 192, 197, 610 P.2d 551, 556
(1980) ("I.C. Ij 18-301 exceeds the scope of the constitutional constraints on
double jeopardy").

That the ldaho Supreme Court found no double jeopardy

violation under the broader provisions of I.C.

3 18-301 (repealed 1995) shows

that the legislature did not intend for defendants who injure multiple victims to be
punished only once.

The question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments
are "multiple" is essentially one of legislative intent. State v. Osweiler, 140 ldaho
824, 826, 103 P.3d 437,439 (2004) (

a Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493,499

(1984). Even if the crimes are the same, if it is evident that a state legislature
intended to authorize cumulative punishments, a court's inquiry ends. Osweiler,
140 ldaho at 827, 103 P.3d 440

(mOhio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 n.8).

"Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, legislative history
and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering
the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." State v. Mercer, 143 ldaho 108,
109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006) (quoting State v. Hart, 135 ldaho 827, 829, 25
P.3d 850, 852 (2001)). "In construing statutes, the plain, obvious and rational
meaning is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow hidden sense." Mercer,
143 ldaho at 109, 138 P.3d at 309 (quoting Hiaainson v. Westeraard, 100 ldaho
687, 691, 604 P.2d 51, 55 (1979). "In determining the ordinary meaning of a
statute 'effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that
none will be void, superfluous, or redundant."' Mercer, 143 ldaho at 109, 138
P.3d at 309 (

a In re Winton Lumber Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d

664, 666 (1936))
Here, Turney was charged, convicted and ultimately sentenced for two
violations of the aggravated DUI statute which provides, in pertinent part, that the
defendant shall be guilty of a felony for "causing great bodily harm, permanent
disability or permanent disfigurement to any person other than himself' while
driving under the influence. I.C. § 18-8006(1). Based upon this plain language,

the legislature has criminalized the act of causing harm not merely increased the
punishment for DUI. Turney's argument that the crime of aggravated DUI in
violation of I.C. 18-8006(1) is an enhancement statute which "simply raise[s] the
punishment for DUI to a felony when great bodily injury occurs" (Appellant's brief,
p . l l ) , is directly contrary to the legislative intent. The legislature specifically
intended that a defendant, such as Turney, may be punished for violation of I.C.
§ 18-8006 whenever "any" victim is injured by his act of driving under the

influence. Turney's argument is contrary to the plain language of I.C. § 18-8006,
and as such, his double jeopardy claim fails.
Turney's contention that he is being twice punished for one act of drunk
driving is without merit. Turney is being punished for two acts of injuring two
other human beings. Because the two aggravated DUI convictions in this case
did not result in Turney being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, he is
not entitled to relief
111.
Turnev Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion

A.

Introduction
The district court imposed concurrent terms of life imprisonment with

fifteen years fixed upon a jury finding Turney guilty of two counts of aggravated
DUI and being a persistent violator. (R., pp. 158-60.) Although Turney contends
on appeal that his sentences are excessive (Appellant's brief, pp.12-14), he has
failed to show from the record that the district court abused its discretion

B.

Standard of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review it

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the

sentencing court abused its discretion.
C.

Id.

Turnev Has Failed To Establish The Sentences Imposed Are Excessive
Under Anv Reasonable View of the Facts
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive. Farwell, 144 ldaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401 (2007). To establish that
the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could
not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals
of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

Id.

Where

reasonable minds might differ, the sentences imposed by the district court must
stand. State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
Aggravated DUI is a felony punishable by a maximum ten year period of
incarceration. I.C. 3 18-8006(1)(a).' However, when a defendant, like Turney, is
convicted of aggravated DUI and is also found to be a persistent violator, his
underlying sentences may be enhanced up to life imprisonment. I.C. 3 19-2514.
Turney does not contend his sentences fall outside of the statutory limits.
(Appellant's brief, p.12.) Instead, he asserts the trial court abused its sentencing
1

When Turney was sentenced on May 3, 2006, I.C. § 18-8006(1)(a) provided for
a maximum ten year period of incarceration. I.C. § 18-8006(1)(a), however, was
subsequently amended and the maximum period of incarceration was increased
from ten to fifteen years. See 2006 ldaho Session Laws, ch. 261.

discretion given he was "truthful in the past" and has "potential for the future."
(Appellant's brief, p.14.)
Contrary to Turney's assertions on appeal, the facts of this case clearly
support the sentences imposed.

In sentencing Turney the district court

examined the the relevant legal criteria. (Sent. Tr., p. 1038, L.l - p. 1049, L.1.)
The court considered protection of society as its foremost obligation, recognizing
that "[alggravated DUls are particularly heinous .... [as] these kinds of activities
kill and maim innocent people." (Sent. Tr., p.1038, L.6 - p.1039, L.3.) In this
case, Turney put other peoples' lives in danger when he decided to drink and
drive and in fact seriously injured two veteran Boise police officers when he
smashed his taxicab into their patrol cars.
The sentencing court examined Turney's twenty-year criminal history,
which included seven prior felony convictions (larceny, grand theft by
possession, theft by receiving stolen property, grand theft, using a telephone to
harass, forgery (2 times)) and his failed attempts at probation. (Sent. Tr., p.1046,
L.17 - p.1049, L.1; PSI, pp.3-7.)

In reviewing the PSI, the court also noted

Turney's behavior had not changed while he was incarcerated:
While in prison you racked up a number of disciplinary reports
which includes substance abuse at prison and your continued use
and your continued misbehavior includes, I will note, lying to staff. I
bring that up because both you and your counsel have maintained
that you are not untruthful.
(Sent. Tr., p.1043, Ls.17-21.)

Given his criminal history, the district court

specifically discounted Turney's claim of being truthful, reasoning:
[Tlhe forgeries are crimes that suggest you are untruthful.
But more importantly, I agree with Miss Longhurst [the prosecutor],

you told a version which was sympathetic to the jury, I think
calculated, to suggest that you were somehow the victim ... in
these forgeries, that you did not know signing someone else's
name was somehow a violation of law.. ..
So for all of your counsel's representations and yours that
you are truthful, clearly you are not truthful because you lied to the
jury in an effort to make them feel sorry for you and in an effort to
mitigate the effect of them learning that you were a felon. So you
somewhat cleverly decided to bring it out in your direct examination
so that you could present your side to the jury. But you and I know
that what you told the jury was not true. So all of this business
today of you're not a liar, you've always taken responsibility for
what it is that you have done, that you are truthful is not true.

. ...
It's important because you are now standing before the
Court proclaiming that you continue to be innocent and you and
your attorney are suggesting that somehow this should mitigate the
punishment and that I should believe it because you are truthful
when the record clearly establishes that you are not truthful.
(Sent. Tr., p.1044, L.10 - p.1046, L.11.) The court was also not impressed with
Turney's claimed desire to submit to a polygraph test noting that "nothing
prevented you [Turney] from going out and doing your own polygraph if that is
what you really wanted to do." (Sent. Tr., p.1033, Ls.5-13; p.1037, Ls.12-25.)
Despite Turney's contention, the court did take into account his "potential
for the future," however, the court was troubled that, despite having "a lot of
programming," Turney's prior attempts at rehabilitation failed:
The other thing that I [the court] noticed is that you've had a lot of
programming. You've had cognitive self-change, you've had whole
vision, you've had thinking errors, breaking barriers, anger
management, rationale recovery. You have been to Port of Hope.
You have had a lot of programming, none of it has worked.
(Sent. Tr., p.1043, Ls.11-16.)
Turney's sentences are not excessive given the nature of his offenses, his
character and his unwillingness to accept responsibility for his actions. The

district court noted Turney's failure to accept responsibility, emphasized the
seriousness of the offense and Turney's history, and considered all other
information before it, including Turney's "truthfulness" and "potential for the
future" and determined "imprisonment is appropriate punishment." (Sent. Tr.,
p.1039, Ls.6-7.) Under any reasonable view of the facts in this case, the district
court acted well within its discretion when it imposed concurrent unified life
sentences with fifteen years fixed upon a jury convicting Turney for two counts of
aggravated DUE and being a persistent violator. The record shows the sentences
imposed were not only warranted, but also necessary to achieve the primary
sentencing objective of protecting society. Turney has failed to carry his burden
of establishing that the sentencing court abused its discretion
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests dismissal of Turney's appeal on the
grounds that he failed to challenge the information in a timely I.C.R. 12(b)(2)
motion prior to trial. In the alternative, the state requests this Court affirm both of
Turney's convictions and concurrent sentences for aggravated DUI and being a
persistent violator.
DATED this 5th day of December 2008.

i

ANN WlLKlNSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this Cith day of December, 2008, sewed a
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy
addressed to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Deputy Attorney General

